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Since 2007, the EU has developed a continental, 
and thus pan-African, approach, based on an Afri-
ca-EU Strategic Partnership1 that also covers the 
African Mediterranean. The June 2016 EU Global 
Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)2 
has also directly linked the Mediterranean to the 
Middle East and Africa, following the “Neighbours 
of the EU’s Neighbours” approach.3 It is therefore 
time to assess the potential implications of these 
progressive, strategic reorientations, as 2017 will 
also be remembered as the year Morocco returned 
to the African family through the African Union (AU).
The June 2016 EUGS and the Mediterranean: 
The EU’s “Surrounding Regions,” the “Arc of 
Crisis” and the “Resilience” Concept
This article concentrates on the parts of the EUGS 
directly linked to the Mediterranean, the Middle East 
and Africa, but one should keep in mind that there 
are many other specific thematic chapters of inter-
est for the region, such as the one on “A More Effec-
tive Migration Policy” or another entitled: “An Inte-
grated Approach to Conflicts and Crises.”
“State and Societal Resilience to our East and 
South” is the EU’s second external action priority 
(point 3.2) identified in the EUGS, after the “The 
Security of Our Union” (point 3.1). What is interest-
ing here, is the broad geographical coverage: the 
EU’s eastern and southern “surrounding regions” 
and the use of the “resilience” concept. To the east, 
reference is first made to the need for the EU to “in-
vest in the resilience of states and societies (…) 
stretching into Central Asia, and south down to 
Central Africa”. The “neighbours of the EU’s neigh-
bours” or “the EU’s broader neighbourhood” ap-
proach is thus clearly taken into consideration as a 
priority, with the arc of crisis remaining in the back-
ground.4 Then, the concept of “resilience” is de-
fined as being: the “ability of states and societies to 
reform, thus withstanding and recovering from inter-
nal and external crises.” Therefore, the EU will, with 
its partners, “promote resilience in its surrounding 
regions,” since a “resilient state” is a “secure state, 
and security is key for prosperity and democracy.” 
According to the EUGS, resilience encompasses 
“all individuals and the whole of society,” and a “re-
silient society featuring democracy, trust in institu-
tions, and sustainable development lies at the heart 
of a resilient state.” Thus, resilience is the new key-
word in the area, and might be considered as a 
more realpolitik approach based on the stabilization 
of the EU’s neighbours, compared with the promo-
tion of the (too) ambitious economic, legal, institu-
tional and political reforms, including “deep democ-
racy” criteria, promoted until recently under the 
ENP. The arc of crisis is clearly in the background 
and EU’s interest in the stability of its neighbours is 
1 The Africa EU Strategic Partnership, 2007, www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf
2 A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/
eugs_review_web.pdf 
3 Ewan lannon, “The ‘neighbours of the EU’s neighbours,’ the ‘EU’s broader neighbourhood’ and the ‘arc of crisis and strategic challenges’ 
from the Sahel to Central Asia”, in Sieglinde Gstohl & Erwan lannon, The Neighbours of the European Union’s Neighbours - Diplomatic and 
Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 1-25.
4 Ibid.
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the first priority given the current development of 
transnational threats, especially terrorism.
Then, the enlargement policy of the EU is mentioned 
with references again to the “challenges of migration, 
energy security, terrorism and organized crime” that 
are “shared between the EU, the Western Balkans 
and Turkey.” Resilience is therefore also valid within 
the pre-accession framework, whereas, as stressed 
in the EUGS, EU policy towards the candidate coun-
tries will continue to be based on a “clear, strict and 
fair accession process.” In fact, with the Juncker 
Commission, the new DG NEAR (Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) was created to 
reflect the so-called enlargement fatigue, whereas 
the activation of Article 50 TEU for BREXIT has 
launched an unprecedented process of narrowing 
the EU. The re-establishment of the death penalty in 
Turkey, regularly mentioned by President Erdogan, 
would also stop this country’s accession process.
In the subsequent part of the EUGS entitled: “Our 
Neighbours,” state and societal resilience is again 
identified as being the “strategic priority in the neigh-
bourhood.” Reference is made in this regard to Tuni-
sia and Georgia, therefore considered as the current 
ENP frontrunners and as “prosperous, peaceful and 
stable democracies” that could “reverberate across 
their respective regions.” The incentives are, howev-
er, the usual ones: Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (DCFTAs), the creation of a still unde-
fined “economic area with countries implementing 
DCFTAs,” the extension of “Trans-European Net-
works and the Energy Community,” and also “en-
hanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, 
research cooperation and civil society platforms.” 
Last but not least is the “full participation in EU pro-
grammes and agencies.” What is more innovative is 
the reference to a “strategic dialogue with a view to 
paving the way for these countries’ further involve-
ment in CSDP.” It is interesting to note that Morocco 
or Ukraine, that were previously considered as the 
ENP frontrunners, are not mentioned in this part. Sur-
prisingly there are only two references to Ukraine in 
the whole EUGS linked of course to Russia’s “viola-
tion of international law and the destabilization of 
Ukraine,” and to “Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Crimea.” Morocco and Egypt are not mentioned at all 
in the EUGS, which is worth noting.
The EUGS is also focusing on the idea of developing 
a “multifaceted approach to resilience in its surround-
ing regions” and “pursuing tailor-made policies to 
support inclusive and accountable governance, criti-
cal for the fight against terrorism, corruption and or-
ganized crime, and for the protection of human 
rights.” Differentiation between the EU’s neighbours 
will be increased and a multi-layered (bilateral, multi-
lateral, state and non-state actors) approach will be 
developed, as the EU will support “different paths to 
resilience” in its broader neighbourhood. The risk 
here is to go too far with differentiation, which can 
lead to discrimination and promote a double-stan-
dard approach. Another clear trend is to better asso-
ciate the EU Member States to the EU actions in cer-
tain specific areas. In this regard the EU will adopt a 
“joined-up approach to its humanitarian, develop-
ment, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, ed-
ucation, health and research policies” and improve 
“horizontal coherence between the EU and its Mem-
ber States.” The development-security nexus ap-
proach has already been adopted in the Sahel strat-
egy and to some extent in the Horn of Africa and will 
now be extended. However, clear evaluations, good 
practices and lessons must be drawn from these ex-
periences.
Connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle 
East and Africa: towards a More Geopolitical 
Approach Vis à Vis the EU’s Broader 
Neighbourhood “Cooperative Regional 
Orders”?
A specific section (3.4) on “Cooperative Regional 
Orders” has been introduced in the EUGS. This is 
where the linkage between the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East and Africa is made under the theme: “A 
Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle 
East and Africa.” The first link between the “Mediter-
ranean, Middle East and parts of Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca” is that they “are in turmoil.” Therefore, “solving 
conflicts and promoting development and human 
rights in the south is essential to addressing the 
threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, 
migration and climate change.” A quite vague refer-
ence to “the opportunity of shared prosperity” is then 
made at the end of the section. The fact that the strat-
egy is security-oriented is normal in the sense that 
the EUGS is a product of the High Representative, in 
charge of CFSP/CSDP issues, but one should also 
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think about the perception such an approach may 
have in the abovementioned regions.
At the level of the institutional actors, the EU will rein-
force its “support for and cooperation with regional 
and sub-regional organizations in Africa and the Mid-
dle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in 
the region.” The institutional actors of interest for this 
article, and which were explicitly mentioned by the 
EUGS, are: the Arab League, the Union for the Med-
iterranean, the African Union, the Economic Commu-
nity of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the 
East African Community and the G5 Sahel. However, 
the strategy is based on “flexibility in helping to bridge 
divides and support regional players in delivering 
concrete results.” Moreover, the EU’s “bilateral and 
multilateral policies and frameworks” will be used as 
well as “partnering” with “civil societies in the region.” 
This functional and flexible approach, relying also on 
civil societies, will not be easy to implement given the 
complexity of the interrelationships among and be-
tween the different institutional and civil society ac-
tors. A lot of pragmatism will therefore be required 
and informality should be privileged, at least at the 
start of the process.
Among the five lines of action identified in this part, the 
first one is the “Maghreb and the Middle East” where 
the European Union will “support functional multilater-
al cooperation.” What is striking is how the document 
reflects the “US’-MENA” approach to the region. It is 
neither the “Euro-Mediterranean” nor the ENP that are 
referred to. The general objective is to “back practical 
cooperation” and to do so “including the Union for the 
Mediterranean.” A number of sectors are identified: 
“border security, trafficking, counterterrorism, non-pro-
liferation, water and food security, energy and climate, 
infrastructure and disaster management.” Dialogue 
and negotiation is also envisaged regarding regional 
conflicts (Syria, Libya and Palestinian- Israeli). At this 
level, it is of course the Quartet and the Arab League 
that are mentioned as key partners.
The second line of action is related to “sectoral coop-
eration with Turkey;” reinforcing the feeling that the 
“strict and fair accession conditionality” mentioned in 
the EUGS highlights a clear “negotiation fatigue” 
with respect to Turkey. In other words, Turkish stabili-
zation and the role of this country as an actor in the 
externalization of the EU’s border controls are now 
more important than its democratization process, ac-
cording to the Copenhagen Political Criteria. The mi-
gration crisis and the adoption of the EU-Turkey state-
ment on 18 March 2016 on the migration issue, just 
two months before the publication of the EUGS, 
have certainly played a role in this respect.
Turkish stabilization and the role 
of this country as an actor in the 
externalization of the EU’s border 
controls are now more important 
than its democratization process
The third line of action is the “Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries.” Iran’s 
“nuclear deal and its implementation” is also men-
tioned as well as the “dialogue with Iran and GCC 
countries on regional conflicts, human rights and 
counterterrorism.” In other words, it seems that the 
EU is trying to profile itself as a potential mediator 
regarding the conflict in Yemen, for example, where 
the humanitarian situation is worsening every day.
The fourth line of action is more innovative as it is 
about “interconnections between North and Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, as well as between the Horn of Africa 
and the Middle East.” The idea to support coopera-
tion across sub-regions derives again from the Neigh-
bours of the EU’s Neighbours approach. A second 
point is, however, a bit more difficult to understand. It 
is the idea of fostering “triangular relationships across 
the Red Sea between Europe, the Horn and the Gulf 
to face shared security challenges and economic op-
portunities.” This might be linked to the fact that Ye-
men, which is not a GCC member, is increasingly 
linked to the other fragile states of the Horn of Africa 
(Sudan and Somalia) as massive refugee flows are 
connecting the zone and many transnational destabi-
lizing factors, such as terrorism and human traffick-
ing, have to be taken into consideration. In addition, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Eritrea, 
Djibouti and Somalia are all Red Sea riparian, so this 
might well be another bridge across the EU’s tradi-
tional, geographical administrative silos.
While it is good news that the “cross-border dynam-
ics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake 
Chad regions” will be systematically addressed 
Pa
no
ra
m
a
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
al
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 | 
T
he
 E
M
P
 a
nd
 O
th
er
 A
ct
or
s
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
7
21
6
through “closer links with the African Union, the Eco-
nomic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel,” no clear methodolo-
gy has yet been identified. The dialogue should thus 
produce recommendations soon for new innovative 
instruments to work at cross-border and transnation-
al levels. For the time being, the Cross Border Coop-
eration (CBC) track of the ENP has generated poor 
results because of the reluctance of Russia to be an 
actor in the Eastern Partnership and northern dimen-
sion, but also because the EU instruments were too 
EU-inspired (EU structural funds). In other words, 
new specific instruments of cooperation created on 
the basis of partners’ requirements still have to be 
designed.
The last line of action is “African peace and develop-
ment,” which implies an intensification of the “coop-
eration with and support for the African Union, as 
well as ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development in Eastern Africa, and the East Afri-
can Community.” In this respect, the progressive cre-
ation of a network of free trade areas, in the form of 
(regional/interim) Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) is mentioned. It will be important, in the com-
ing years, to connect the EPA network to the Eu-
ro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and to 
other FTAs concluded recently by the EU in Asia (no-
tably with ASEAN members). However, the emphasis 
is clearly and logically placed on the trade/develop-
ment-security nexus. The first priority of the EU-Afri-
can partnership is to “support peace and security ef-
forts” in Africa and to assist African organizations in 
working on “conflict prevention, counterterrorism, or-
ganized crime, migration and border management.” 
This includes working at the diplomatic, CSDP and 
trade/development levels and reinforcing the sub-re-
gional strategies (including Sahel, Horn of Africa, 
Great Lakes and Gulf of Guinea). But now an inter-
esting novelty to note is that Morocco is to be taken 
into consideration in implementing the Africa EU 
Strategic Partnership, and this is of particular interest 
to the Mediterranean at large.
Conclusion
One can conclude that the 2016 EUGS is, for the 
time being, a diplomatic success, as its endorse-
ment by, at that time, 28 Member States was not a 
foregone conclusion. Although the result of numer-
ous compromises, the Strategy goes beyond a sim-
ple threat list and is much more detailed compared 
to the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 
2008 update. There are, for instance, more devel-
opments in methodology and the general approach. 
It is, therefore, a real medium-term “Strategy” but 
not yet an EU Security/Defence “Doctrine.” More-
over, the fact that, for the time being, there is no real 
supplementary financial means is of course a major 
issue. We are currently in the 2014-2020 multiannu-
al financial framework, meaning that it would be very 
difficult to mobilize supplementary financial resourc-
es before the next three years, and one should not 
forget the impact of BREXIT at the financial level, 
regarding the EU’s internal and external policies. 
While in 2011, in the aftermath of the so-called 
“Arab Spring,” the key words for the ENP were: 
“deep and sustainable democracy” and the “more 
for more” approach, in 2017, stabilization, resil-
ience, pragmatism and the “EU’s interests first,” 
characterize the new approach. The resilience 
concept might be well received by partners con-
fronted with unprecedented security challenges. 
For instance, Tunisia will certainly benefit from an 
increase in Security Sector Reform assistance. 
But the consequences of developing a more flexi-
ble approach in terms of relations with authoritari-
an regimes should be evaluated very seriously.
What is striking is that the Mediterranean has been 
mentioned in the EUGS, but at the same time al-
most replaced by “North Africa or Maghreb and the 
Middle East,” thus coming closer to the MENA-US 
concept. It is, however, clear that the Mediterranean 
is increasingly fragmented given the recent crisis 
and wars. Could we witness the end of the (EEC) 
EU Mediterranean policies developed since 1972 
with the “Global Mediterranean Policy,” followed by 
the renewed Mediterranean Policy” (1992) and the 
“Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (1995)? Today, 
the ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean are 
the two main frameworks for cooperation, but at the 
strategic level, the Mediterranean is included in a 
broader African/Asian Neighbourhood. Of course, 
the ENP has already changed the framework for co-
operation while the Union for the Mediterranean in-
cludes 43 members. However, it is clear that we are 
entering a new phase in Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tionships. 
